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Adama Dieng is the third Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide to be appointed 
by the United Nations Secretary-General. He follows two distinguished predecessors 
who, like Dieng, have very impressive records as activists and advocates for the 
protection and promotion of human rights. The first to hold the mandate, Juan Méndez, 
was Special Adviser from 2004 to 2007. He was followed by Francis Deng, who served 
until 2012.  
 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is 
the first human rights treaty of the United Nations system.
1
 Adopted on 9 December 
1948, a day before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it reflects the difficult 
debates of the time and in particular the challenge of implementation. The Convention 
contains an enduring and seemingly immutable definition of the crime of genocide but it 
deals inadequately with enforcement and related matters. Prosecution is reserved to the 
courts of the territorial state, while dispute settlement is assigned to the International 
Court of Justice. In contrast with future human rights treaties, adopted by the General 
Assembly in the 1960s and subsequently, there is no dedicated organ for implementation. 
The insufficient mechanisms of the Genocide Convention have been frequently 
criticized, with a range of initiatives advanced over the years. As early as 1965, a 
proposal to set up a treaty body was made by Arcot Krishnaswami in the Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities.
2
 The 
idea was pursued by Nicodème Ruhashyankiko in his study for the Sub-Commission, and 
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seems to have met with a favourable response from States.
3
 In 1994, the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities proposed the 
creation of a treaty body: 
 
Requests the States Parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide . 
. . to encourage – or even undertake – the drafting and adoption of a control mechanism in the form of a 
treaty committee charged in particular with monitoring compliance of States Parties with the commitments 
which they undertook . . . through the assessment of the reports submitted by the States Parties and, on a 
preventive basis, to draw the attention of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to situations which my 
lead to genocide.
4
 
 
A similar proposal was made by the Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary and 
arbitrary executions of the Commission on Human Rights.
5
 Establishment of the Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, in 2004, is an effort to fill the gap in the 1948 
Convention concerning implementation. 
 
Establishment of the Position of Special Adviser 
 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced his intention to establish the position of 
‘Special Rapporteur on the prevention of genocide’ at the Stockholm International 
Forum, hosted by the Swedish government in January 2004 on the theme of ‘preventing 
genocide: threats and responsibilities’. The mandate-holder was to be supported by the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights but would report directly to the 
Security Council in order to make the link ‘between massive and systematic violations of 
human rights and threats to international peace and security’. The Secretary-General 
spoke of ‘conspicuous gaps’ in the capacity of the United Nations to provide ‘early 
warning of genocide or comparable crimes’. 6 
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In March 2004, the Secretary-General circulated the draft mandate to the Security 
Council. On 7 April 2004, he spoke in Geneva to the Commission on Human Rights on 
the occasion of the International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 
unveiling his Action Plan to Prevent Genocide. The Action Plan had five components: (a) 
preventing armed conflict, which usually provides the context for genocide; (b) 
protection of civilians in armed conflict including a mandate for United Nations 
peacekeepers to protect civilians; (c) ending impunity through judicial action in both 
national and international courts; (d) early and clear warning of situations that could 
potentially degenerate into genocide and the development of a United Nations capacity to 
analyse and manage information; and (e) swift and decisive action along a continuum of 
steps, including military action. He reiterated his intention to establish what he was now 
calling the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.
7
 
In July 2004, the Secretary-General announced the appointment of Juan Méndez 
to the position.
8
 Annan explained that the mandate was derived from Security Council 
Resolution 1366 (2001), in which the Council had acknowledged the lessons to be 
learned from the failure of preventive efforts that preceded such tragedies as the genocide 
in Rwanda and resolved to take appropriate action within its competence to prevent any 
recurrence. In Resolution 1366, the Security Council spoke of ‘the shared commitment to 
save people from the ravages of armed conflicts’, noting ‘the lessons to be learned for all 
concerned from the failure of preventive efforts that preceded such tragedies as the 
genocide in Rwanda [...] and the massacre in Srebrenica’. The Council resolved ‘to take 
appropriate action within its competence, combined with the efforts of Member States, to 
prevent the recurrence of such tragedies’.9 Two operative paragraphs of the Resolution 
provide support for establishment of the position. In operative paragraph 5, the Council 
 
Expresses its willingness to give prompt consideration to early warning or prevention cases brought to its 
attention by the Secretary-General and  in this regard, encourages the Secretary-General to convey to the 
Security Council his assessment of potential threats to international peace and security  with due regard to 
relevant regional and sub-regional dimensions, as appropriate, in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
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In operative paragraph 10, the Security Council 
 
Invites the Secretary-General to refer to the Council information and analysis from within the United 
Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law 
and human rights law and on potential conflict situations arising, inter alia, from ethnic, religious and 
territorial disputes, poverty and lack of development and expresses its determination to give serious 
consideration to such information and analysis regarding situations which it deems to represent a threat to 
international peace and security. 
 
The mandate of the Special Adviser states: 
 
The Special Adviser will (a) collect existing information, in particular from within the United Nations 
system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and 
racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; (b) act as a mechanism of early 
warning to the Secretary-General, and through him to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention 
potential situations that could result in genocide; (c) make recommendations to the Security Council, 
through the Secretary-General, on actions to prevent or halt genocide; (d) liaise with the United Nations 
system on activities for the prevention of genocide and work to enhance the United Nations capacity to 
analyse and manage information relating to genocide or related crimes. The methodology employed would 
entail a careful verification of facts and serious political analyses and consultations, without excessive 
publicity. This would help the Secretary-General define the steps necessary to prevent the deterioration of 
existing situations into genocide. The Special Adviser would not make a determination on whether 
genocide within the meaning of the Convention had occurred. The purpose of his activities, rather, would 
be practical and intended to enable the United Nations to act in a timely fashion.
10
 
 
Elsewhere, the Secretary-General has explained the role of the Special Adviser: 
 
The Special Adviser understands his mandate as that of a catalyst within the United Nations system, and 
more broadly within the international community, to increase awareness of the causes and dynamics of 
genocide, to warn of the potential of genocide in a particular country or region, and make recommendations 
towards preventing or halting it and to open up space for partners to undertake preventive action in 
accordance with their mandates and responsibilities under international law.
11
 
 
The ‘mission’ of the Special Adviser was endorsed by the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government in the ‘Outcome Document’.12 
Almost immediately upon his appointment, the Special Adviser was being asked 
to make determinations about whether specific atrocities, some of them ongoing and 
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some of them far in the past, should be described as genocide. Wisely, he refused to 
engage in such discussions, declaring that this was outside his mandate.
13
 ‘If I wait until 
all the elements of genocide are in place according to international law, then by definition 
I have not prevented it. From the start I have said I am not in a position to “certify” or not 
certify that genocide has happened’, he told one questioner.14 
In September 2004, the Special Adviser visited Darfur accompanied by the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. The two reported directly to the Security Council on 
their mission.
15
 A year later, he conducted a follow-up visit to the region.
16
 This time, his 
request to present the report to the Security Council was denied, dispelling a broad 
perception that the prestige of his position meant that he had more or less direct access to 
the body. In late 2005, the Special Adviser visited Côte d’Ivoire, preparing a report 
outlining a number of important human rights issues but making no reference to 
genocide.
17
 Much of the work of the Special Adviser has taken place behind the scenes, 
consisting of quiet diplomacy and the drafting of confidential notes containing 
recommendations for the Secretary-General and, ultimately, the Security Council. The 
Special Adviser also assisted units within the United Nations by counselling on issues 
relating to genocide prevention, such as guidelines on hate speech and incitement.
18
 
 
Frustrated attempts to enlarge the mandate 
 
An Advisory Committee on Genocide Prevention was appointed by the Secretary-
General in May 2006 to assist the Special Adviser. Chaired by David Hamburg, President 
Emeritus of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Committee was composed of 
distinguished international personalities including Roméo Dallaire of Canada, Canadian 
Senator and former Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
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Rwanda, Gareth Evans of Australia, President of the International Crisis Group and 
former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Sadako Ogata of Japan, co-Chair of the 
Commission on Human Security and former High Commissioner for Refugees, and 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and former 
Chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. The Advisory 
Committee recommended that the title of the Special Adviser be changed by adding the 
words ‘mass atrocities’, so as ‘to make it broader in scope without the need to determine 
first whether a specific situation has a “genocidal” character’.19 
The Secretary-General proposed to adjust the title slightly, to ‘Special 
Representative’, ‘to better reflect the role and scope of his mandate’, to upgrade the 
position to the rank of Under-Secretary-General from Assistant Secretary-General, and to 
make it a full-time job.
20
 When Francis Deng was appointed to succeed Juan Méndez in 
2007, he was described by the Secretary-General as his Special Adviser on the Prevention 
of Genocide and Mass Atrocity. In August 2007, the Security Council indicated its 
support for the ‘crucial role’ played by the Special Adviser.21 However, the Security 
Council took several months to respond the Secretary-General with respect to the changes 
he was proposing.
22
 Eventually, it requested ‘further details from you on the implications 
of the change in title for Mr Deng’s post set out in your letter’.23 Reporting to the Fifth 
Committee of the General Assembly in December 2007, the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions said that ‘the Secretary-General’s proposals 
concerning the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass 
Atrocities amounted to a policy matter that should be decided upon by the General 
Assembly’.24 A number of States indicated that they shared this view.25 In February 2008, 
the General Assembly authorized the upgrading of the position to that of Under-
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Secretary-General level, but continued to refer to it as ‘Special Adviser on the Prevention 
of Genocide’.26 Interpreting this as discomfort with his initial proposal, the Secretary-
General withdrew to the initial title of ‘Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide’ 
that had been adopted in 2004. 
 
A cognate mandate on the responsibility to protect 
 
At the same time as the Secretary-General appointed Francis Deng, he announced 
that he would establish a complementary position within the Secretariat of ‘Special 
Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect’.27 The mandate was closely related to that of the 
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. The concept of the responsibility to 
protect had been set out and accepted in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 Outcome 
Document, adopted at the Summit of Heads of State and Government on the occasion of 
the sixtieth anniversary of the Charter of the United Nations. The two paragraphs 
describe a responsibility to protect vulnerable populations from threats of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. The position of Special 
Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide is endorsed in paragraph 140 of the Outcome 
Document. The three paragraphs are grouped under a sub-heading: ‘Responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.’28 
The Security Council ‘took note’ of the Secretary-General’s intent to establish the 
position,
29
 but the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly did not confirm the budget 
requisition for this position. In February 2008, the Secretary-General announced the 
appointment of Edward Luck as ‘Special Adviser’ but with no reference to the 
responsibility to protect in the title. As Gareth Evans commented, ‘the 38th floor decided 
to abandon the unequal struggle and accept Mr Luck as an adviser without either a job 
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description or much prospect of tenure longevity’.30 The Secretary-General indicated that 
the Special Adviser would ‘focus on the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity’.31 
The Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly on the responsibility to 
protect in early 2009. He explained that ‘[i]n the interests of both efficiency and 
effectiveness, it should be noted that the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide 
and the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, whose work includes the responsibility 
to protect, have distinct but closely related mandates’.32 He proposed a ‘joint office’ to 
house the two Special Advisers: 
 
The work of the joint office will preserve and enhance existing arrangements, including for capacity-
building and for the gathering and analysis of information from the field, while adding value of its own in 
terms of new arrangements for advocacy, cross-sectoral assessment, common policy, and cumulative 
learning on how to anticipate, prevent and respond to crises relating to the responsibility to protect. 
Proposals for the small joint office, to be headed by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, 
will be submitted to the General Assembly once it has had an opportunity to consider the larger policy 
issues addressed in the present report.
33
 
 
The proposal was further explained in a report by the Secretary-General on early 
warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect: 
 
15. My Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis M. Deng, and my Special Adviser 
responsible for the conceptual, political and institutional development of the responsibility to protect, 
Edward C. Luck, have distinct but closely related responsibilities. Both sets of tasks need to be pursued 
with vigour. 
16. I believe that it is essential both to maintain the distinct elements of these two sets of responsibilities 
and to ensure the close working relationship of the two Special Advisers on the common elements of their 
operational activities, for example, by employing common methodologies whenever possible. To date, their 
efforts have embodied the spirit and practice of system-wide coherence. This spirit of collaboration was 
anticipated by the decision of the Heads of State and Government, in adopting the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome, to include their support for the mission of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide in 
the section on the responsibility to protect. 
17. In order to save resources, eliminate redundancy and maximize synergies and effectiveness, we should 
consider ways to institutionalize the collaboration between the two Special Advisers, including options for 
a joint office. As noted in the annex to my report to the General Assembly, a joint office could “preserve 
and enhance existing arrangements, including for capacity-building and for the gathering and analysis of 
                                                        
30
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information from the field, while adding value on its own in terms of new arrangements for advocacy, 
cross-sectoral assessment, common policy, and cumulative learning on how to anticipate, prevent and 
respond to crises relating to the responsibility to protect” (A/63/677, annex, para. 7). Proposals in this 
regard will be submitted to the Assembly later in 2010. They will take into account the wider range of 
crimes and violations covered by the responsibility to protect, the broad interest in the responsibility to 
protect among Governments, parliaments and civil society and the Assembly’s continuing consideration of 
the concept.
34
 
 
The Secretary-General’s detailed proposal of the joint office was submitted to the 
General Assembly in 2010. He explained that the ‘Special Adviser’, that is, Edward 
Luck, would have the status of Under-Secretary-General but that he would be paid only 
$1 a year.
35
 The proposal was accepted by the Fifth Committee and subsequently adopted 
by the plenary General Assembly, but only after some opposition. Cuba and Bolivia took 
the floor in the General Assembly to complain that there had never been general 
acceptance of ‘the idea that the concept of the responsibility to protect is part of the main 
mandates of the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide’ or that ‘the Special 
Adviser to the Secretary-General for the Responsibility to Protect is part of the office in 
question’.36 Following the establishment of the joint office, in 2011, the Special Advisers 
operated very visibly as a two-person team. 
 The Office of the Special Adviser has devoted great attention to the development 
of a capacity to anticipate developments of concern. These have included conception of a 
‘framework of analysis’ intended to assist in forecasting areas of concern.37 The Special 
Adviser has manifested such concerns publicly, through the issuance of statements from 
time to time concerning country situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
38
 
and Sri Lanka,
39
 and a report on Guinea.
40
 In 2010, even before the ‘joint office’ had 
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been formally approved by the General Assembly, the two Special Advisers issued a joint 
statement on Kyrgyzstan.
41
 Since then, there have been joint statements on Côte 
d’Ivoire,42 Libya43 and Sudan44 Beginning in June 2011, the two Special Advisers issued 
no fewer than five joint statements concerning Syria.
45
 
 Although a close relationship exists between the mandates of the two Special 
Advisers, an expression of concern about the danger of ‘genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing’ does not necessarily mean the same thing as 
one about ‘genocide’ tout court. For example, in January 2011, the two Special Advisers 
issued a statement in which they said they ‘remain gravely concerned about the 
possibility of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing in Côte 
d’Ivoire. We believe that urgent steps should be taken, in line with the “responsibility to 
protect”, to avert the risk of genocide and ensure the protection of all those at risk of mass 
atrocities’. In reality, there was no plausible threat of genocide, although the term had 
been bandied about by both camps in the country’s post-election conflict. By contrast, a 
brief statement in February 2011 concerning Libya spoke about the responsibility to 
protect more generally, and prudently did not mention any particular concern about 
genocide. Rather, it expressed concern about the perpetration of crimes against 
humanity.
46
 The five statements concerning Syria have never invoked the threat of 
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genocide, although they too have warned of the possibility of crimes against humanity
47
 
or of ‘atrocity crimes’.48 Indeed, since the extravagant reference to genocide in Côte 
d’Ivoire in January 2010, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide does not 
appear to have used the term in any of his statements. 
 
A confused vision, and thoughts on the future 
 
 The development of the position of Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide has gone through three phases, as described above. The first responded to 
profound dissatisfaction with the performance of the United Nations in Rwanda in 1994 
and Srebrenica in 1995, both of which have been recognized as acts of genocide in 
important judicial decisions.
49
 It also emerged from a lengthy discussion about 
establishing some form of enforcement mechanism for the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
The ability of the Secretary-General to establish the mandate was certainly due to 
international consensus about a response to the crime of genocide which is, it should be 
recalled, defined narrowly. Indeed, a rather strict interpretation of article 2 of the 
Genocide Convention has been affirmed again and again, in the case law of the 
International Court of Justice and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals. According 
to Payam Akhavan, who prepared a study on the Special Adviser published in 2005, the 
limitations of the mandate were its great strength, distinguishing it from broader 
functions like the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In particular, this warranted 
privileged access to the Security Council.
50
 
 It became immediately apparent that the confined scope of the notion of genocide, 
which had been so useful in facilitating creation of this unprecedented position, would 
also be a source of great frustration to the mandate-holder and his or her team. The 
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Special Adviser would be confronted by various constituencies seeking endorsement of 
historical as well as contemporary facts. Speaking at the bi-annual conference of the 
International Association of Genocide Scholars, in 2005, Juan Méndez found himself 
harshly criticized because of his reluctance to declare that specific situations should be 
labelled as genocide. The audience was hardly consoled when he reminded them that his 
mandate prevented him from making ‘a determination on whether genocide within the 
meaning of the Convention had occurred’. The Special Adviser also confronted great 
difficulty in his interaction with States, who shrunk at the mildest association with him 
because of the stigma that accompanied the term genocide. They might even tolerate a 
visit from a special rapporteur on extra-judicial executions or torture but a mission on 
genocide was simply too toxic. 
 But the greatest difficulty was establishing the boundaries of the mandate itself. If 
the notion of genocide was applied restrictively, and in a manner consistent with the 
mainstream of judicial interpretation, the Special Adviser would have little to keep 
himself occupied. He would be like the firefighters at an airport, dutifully reporting for 
work every morning and then standing by waiting for a plane crash. Presumably some 
airport firefighters have spent a lifetime playing cards and doing crossword puzzles 
waiting for the event that never happens. And yet nobody would want to fly at an airport 
that did not have such a service. If genocide is a crime of which we say ‘never again’, is 
it so misplace to have a watchdog standing by to make sure that such a pledge is fulfilled, 
and sound the alarm if ever there is a suggestion of another Rwanda or Srebrenica? 
 There was an enormous temptation to expand the mandate. One way of so doing 
was to affirm that the task of the Special Adviser was to intervene prior to a genocide. 
This meant he would engage with situations that were not yet genocidal, but for which 
there were warning signs.. Various efforts have been made to identify the pre-cursors of 
genocide. Such an exercise resembles that of looking for the origins of fatal respiratory 
disease. The illness begins with a sniffle or a sneeze. But it would be absurd to treat mild 
colds as life-threatening. So it is with genocide. Tasteless, bigoted jokes may indicate an 
underlying malaise, and there is much evidence of racist ‘humour’ in the build-up to 
genocide in Nazi Germany or Rwanda. But it would be absurd to suggest that this begins 
the slippery slope to the extermination camps. At what point does genocide being a 
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reasonable possibility? Even ethnic conflict leading to killings can hardly be a tipping 
point. History provides no shortage of such situations that never lead to genocide. The 
real enigma of genocide is why the vast majority of violent ethnic conflicts do not lead to 
the intentional extermination of one of the groups involved. 
 An alternative approach is to redefine genocide so as to broaden it. Professor 
David Scheffer, who served as United States Ambassador for War Crimes Issues during 
the 1990s, advanced the concept of ‘atrocity crimes’ as a replacement for the term 
genocide.
51
 His ideas influenced the report of a prestigious American task force. 
However, rather than adopt Professor Scheffer’s innovative concept, the task force 
insisted on re-defining the notion of genocide so as to cover crimes against humanity and 
war crimes as well. ‘To avoid the legalistic arguments that have repeatedly impeded 
timely and effective action, the task force has defined its scope in this report as the 
prevention of “genocide and mass atrocities”…’, the report, entitled Preventing 
Genocide (and not ‘Preventing Genocide and Mass Atrocity’), explained.52  
Something similar was first mooted by the Advisory Committee in its report to 
the Secretary-General on the Special Adviser. But the attempt in 2007 to enlarge the 
mandate to encompass ‘genocide and mass atrocity’ was rebuffed by the Security Council 
and the General Assembly. The Secretary-General had a second arrow in his quiver in the 
related position of Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, but it too initially met 
with rejection. Later, the Secretary-General managed to associate his ‘Special Adviser’ 
with the so-called ‘joint’ Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. 
Since then, despite the insistence of the Secretary-General that ‘it is essential … 
to maintain the distinct elements of these two sets of responsibilities’, in practice the two 
mandates have become blurred. The public statements of the Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide have dealt with Syria and Libya, neither of which can reasonably 
be described as genocidal. The statements have referred to crimes against humanity, not 
genocide. Why should this fall within the ambit of the Special Adviser on the Prevention 
of Genocide at all? For that matter, if the Special Adviser on the Responsibility Protect 
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can intervene in more situations yet otherwise do essentially the same thing as the Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, it will not be long before the raison d’être of the 
latter is questioned. 
The evolution in the mandate of the Special Adviser, and the challenges to its 
definition, reflects a more general legal development towards an understanding of the 
centrality of crimes against humanity within the landscape of atrocity crimes. Crimes 
against humanity is a notion that is broader than genocide in a number of respects. It is  
closely aligned with gross and systematic violations of human rights. Crimes against 
humanity lie at the core of prosecutions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal 
Court. 
Historically, the focus of international justice was on genocide rather than crimes 
against humanity because of dissatisfaction with limitations upon the latter that had been 
imposed at Nuremberg. Yet it was impossible to reach agreement with States on robust 
measures to deal with atrocities if they were defined broadly. In the 1940s, the major 
powers – the United Kingdom, the United States, France and the Soviet Union – were all 
concerned that they too might be found liable if an expansive notion of crimes against 
humanity perpetrated in time of peace was recognized. In such an environment, it was 
only possible to adopt a convention dealing with genocide. To this day there is nothing 
similar for crimes against humanity. 
International law has made enormous strides since the Genocide Convention was 
adopted in 1948. The definition of crimes against humanity has been freed from the 
conservative restrictions imposed at Nuremberg. At the International Criminal Court, 
both genocide and crimes against humanity are considered to be core crimes. The 
responsibility to protect applies when either crime is being committed. A treaty intended 
to replicate the obligations of the Genocide Convention with respect to crimes against 
humanity is being prepared.
53
At the practical level, there remain very few distinctions 
between genocide and crimes against humanity in terms of legal consequences. 
Nevertheless, some tension persists. There remain States that are prepared to accept 
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international initiatives aimed at addressing genocide, to the extent that it is defined 
narrowly, who will continue to resist similar measures if they are framed by crimes 
against humanity. But other constituencies are also involved. Some groups of victims, as 
well as their descendants, insist upon atrocity being described as genocide, dismissing 
anything else as ‘denial’. 
This is the environment from which the Secretary-General’s proposal for a 
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide emerged. In an ideal world, the Secretary-
General would have established, in 2004, a Special Adviser on Crimes Against Humanity 
or a Special Adviser on Atrocity Crimes. His choice was based upon complex reasons, 
some of them driven by hostility to the protection of human rights but others animated by 
a desire to cherish the specificity of ‘the crime of crimes’. As the debate has evolved, we 
now find ourselves with two Special Advisers who are about as distinct as fraternal twins. 
The challenge for the Special Adviser in the years to come will be to protect his unique 
and precious mandate without arresting the progressive legal development quickly 
unfolding before our eyes. 
